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By ensuring that those who have abandoned, or otherwise
lack, significant contacts with New York are prohibited from mak-
ing use of its limitations periods, the Court of Appeals in Antone
has bolstered significantly the efficacy of the borrowing statute as a
tool for limiting forum shopping without destroying the protection
it provides for New York residents.
Anthony J. Cornicello
CPLR 208: Temporary effect of medication administered in treat-
ment of physical injuries is not "insanity" and will not cause toll-
ing of statutes of limitation
Section 208 of the CPLR suspends the running of a statute of
limitations when one entitled to commence an action is under a
disability of infancy or insanity.1 While "insanity" is not expressly
defined by the statute, the courts have construed the term broadly
to mean a mere inability to understand and protect one's legal
rights.2 Recognizing the function of statutes of limitation as stat-
CPLR 208 (Supp. 1984-1985). CPLR 208 provides in pertinent part:
If a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of infancy
or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues ... the time within which the
action must be commenced shall be extended ....
Id. The statute also provides guidelines to determine the length of the tolling period. See id.
When a statute of limitations of three years or more applies, and the time allowed for filing
suit would otherwise expire before or within three years after the disability ends or the
disabled party dies, the claimant receives an extension of three years after the disability has
ceased. Id. When a statute of limitations of less than three years applies, the time for com-
mencing an action is extended by the duration of the disability. Id. In cases of insanity, the
time for commencing an action can not extend more than ten years beyond accrual of the
cause of action. Id.
For the tolling provision to apply the plaintiff must be burdened by the insanity disa-
bility at the time the cause of action accrues. See SIEGEL § 54, at 55. However, some author-
ity suggests that if the plaintiff's insanity results from the defendant's negligence the tolling
provision will apply notwithstanding a lack of contemporaneity. See H. PE'ERFREUND & J.
McLAUGHLIN, NEW YORK PRACTICE 178 (1978); 1 WK&M 208.04 (Supp. 1983).
2 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 547, 435 N.E.2d 1072,
1074, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (1980) (statute does not define insanity); see also SECOND REP.
at 58 (CPA revision committee supported tolling provisions but attempted to correct inequi-
ties that it believed were "unreasonably generous in favor of the disabled plaintiff").
Influenced by other jurisdictions, one New York appellate court construed insanity ge-
nerically to embrace a mere inability to understand and protect one's legal rights. See Hurd
v. County of Allegany, 39 App. Div. 2d 499, 503, 336 N.Y.S.2d 952, 957 (4th Dep't 1972); see
also SIEGEL § 54, at 55 (insanity means inability to protect one's affairs). Historically, in-
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utes of repose, the Court of Appeals refined this broad definition
slightly to require a factual determination of an "overall inability
to function in society."3 Recently, in Eisenbach v. Metropolitan
Transportation Authority,4 the Court further limited the applica-
tion of the insanity toll by excluding from its scope the temporary
effects of medication administered in the treatment of physical
injuries.5
In Eisenbach the plaintiff suffered extensive physical injuries
when he fell from a train operated by one of the defendants and
was struck by a train operated by another defendant.6 He was hos-
pitalized and treated with strong narcotic painkillers that allegedly
sanity has been equated with unsoundness of mind. See DeGogorza v. Knickerbocker Life
Ins. Co., 65 N.Y. 232, 237 (1875). It should be noted, however, that a litigant need not be
adjudicated incompetent to invoke the tolling provision. See, e.g., Hammer v. Rosen, 7
N.Y.2d 376, 379, 165 N.E.2d 756, 757, 198 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (1960) (actual adjudication of
incompetency unnecessary). Moreover, in light of the protective purpose of CPLR 208, dis-
charge from a mental institution does not, in itself, provide sufficient proof of sanity to
deprive an insane litigant of the toll. See Gomillion v. State, 51 Misc. 2d 952, 953, 274
N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (Ct. Cl. 1966). Generally, insanity has been treated as a question of fact,
see Hurd, 39 App. Div. 2d at 503, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 957, that requires a hearing for proper
resolution, see Dunn v. Mager, 47 App. Div. 2d 919, 919, 367 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (2d Dep't
1975). Furthermore, a temporary inability to protect one's affairs has been deemed sufficient
to constitute insanity. See Hurd, 39 App. Div. 2d at 502-03, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 956-57; The
Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 585 (1973) (discussion of Hurd court's definition of "in-
sanity"); see also McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 547, 435 N.E.2d
1072, 1074, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (1980) (dicta); infra note 16.
3 See McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 435 N.E.2d 1072, 1075,
450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (1980). The defendants in McCarthy moved for dismissal of the per-
sonal injury action as time-barred by CPLR 214. Id. at 546, 435 N.E.2d at 1073, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 458. The plaintiff offered expert evidence of a "post traumatic neurosis" that
caused him to "repress and forget.., much of the accident," notwithstanding his ability to
attend college, hold a job, and file a third-party complaint in a suit related to the same
accident. Id. The plaintiff's claim that this affliction constituted the insanity contemplated
by CPLR 208 was unanimously rejected, and the Court declared that the toll the plaintiff
sought was "untenable as a matter of law." Id. at 548, 435 N.E.2d at 1074, 450 N.Y.S.2d at
459. The Court held that the statute should be read narrowly and ruled that the insanity
toll applies only to persons unable to protect their legal rights due to "an over-all inability
to function in society." Id. at 548-49, 435 N.E.2d at 1075, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 460. The Court
noted that to the extent that Prude v. County of Erie, 47 App. Div. 2d 111, 364 N.Y.S.2d
643 (4th Dep't 1975), and Hurd v. County of Allegany, 39 App. Div. 2d 499, 336 N.Y.S.2d
952 (4th Dep't 1972), might support the post traumatic neurosis concept, they should not be
followed. McCarthy, 55 N.Y.2d at 549 n.3, 435 N.E.2d at 1075 n.3, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 460 n.3;
see generally FnrH RFP. at 43 (expressing desire to draft CPLR 208 in such a way as to
avoid broad, unwarranted extensions of time within which to commence an action).
4 62 N.Y.2d 973, 468 N.E.2d 293, 479 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1984).
1 Id. at 975, 468 N.E.2d at 294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
6 Id. at 974, 468 N.E.2d at 294, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
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rendered him disoriented. The plaintiff commenced a negligence
action, and in response, the defendants moved to dismiss, asserting
that the action was time-barred.8 Special Term denied the motion
and ordered a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff was enti-
tled to a toll of the statute of limitations due to insanity.9 The
Appellate Division reversed, holding that the tolling provision was
inapplicable because the plaintiff alleged merely physical, not
mental, side effects from his medication, and hence, was not in-
sane.10 The Court of Appeals affirmed in a unanimous memoran-
dum opinion, holding that the tolling provision of CPLR 208 shall
not be construed to embrace the temporary effects of painkilling
medications used to treat physical injuries."'
The Court reasoned that a narrow interpretation of "insanity"
was necessary to ensure the viability of statutes of limitation as
statutes of repose.12 The Court did not acknowledge the Appellate
Division's distinction between physical and mental incapacity, 3
but explained that only the legislature should undertake to expand
the statute to include the temporary effects of the plaintiff's
Id. The plaintiff claimed that the medication caused him to be "generally confused,
disoriented, and unable to effectively attend to [his] affairs." Id.
8 Id. The defendants contended that the plaintiff's action was precluded by the appli-
cable statute of limitations found in subdivision 2 of § 1276 of the Public Authorities Law.
Eisenbach, 97 App. Div. 2d at 808, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 677. Section 1276(2) states in pertinent
part: "An action against the authority founded on tort shall not be commenced more than
one year after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued. ... N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §
1276(2) (McKinney 1982). Relying on this statute, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
in accordance with CPLR 3211(a)(5). 62 N.Y.2d at 974, 468 N.E.2d at 294, 479 N.Y.S.2d at
339. CPLR 3211(a)(5) states in pertinent part: "A party may move for judgment dismissing
one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that . . .the cause of
action may not be maintained because of ... [a] statute of limitations .... CPLR
3211(a)(5).
' 62 N.Y.2d at 974, 468 N.E.2d at 294, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
10 97 App. Div. 2d at 809, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 677. In a memorandum decision the Appel-
late Division, Second Department, held that "[i]mplicit in the cases construing the word
'insanity'. . . is the requirement that the inability to function in society be a result of
mental illness." Id.
1 62 N.Y.2d at 975, 468 N.E.2d at 294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
12 Id. at 974-75, 468 N.E.2d at 294, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (quoting McCarthy v. Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 435 N.E.2d 1072, 1075, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460
(1980)); for a discussion of the McCarthy case, see supra note 3.
11 97 App. Div. 2d at 809, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 677. The Appellate Division's holding was
based exclusively on the fact that the plaintiff, while alleging physical effects, failed to allege
any mental side effects of the medication. Id. The holding of the Court of Appeals, however,
completely disallowed a toll of the statute for the temporary effects of medication, without
regard to whether the effects were physical or mental. See Eisenbach, 62 N.Y.2d at 975, 468
N.E.2d at 294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
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medication. 4
It is submitted that the Eisenbach holding will have little
practical effect on the conceptual definition of insanity because a
determination of insanity is largely a factual question to be de-
cided within guidelines already established by judicial construc-
tion.15 Relevant case law indicates that for purposes of CPLR 208,
insanity includes a permanent or temporary inability to protect
one's own legal rights due to an overall inability to function in so-
ciety.16 As a result of Eisenbach, this definition has been modified
only slightly to exclude the temporary effect of medication admin-
istered to treat physical injuries.17
It is suggested that the greatest significance of Eisenbach lies
not in its narrow declaration of substantive law, but rather, in the
Court's willingness to base its decision solely on the cause of the
mental condition rather than focus on the merits of the plaintiff's
insanity claim.18 In the past, while acknowledging that insanity is
14 62 N.Y.2d at 975, 468 N.E.2d at 295, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
"See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 547, 435 N.E.2d 1072,
1074, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (1980) (acknowledging that temporary afflictions have been ju-
dicially declared "insanity," but limiting insanity to overall inability to function in society);
Barnes v. County of Onondaga, 103 App. Div. 2d 624, 628-29, 481 N.Y.S.2d 539, 544 (4th
Dep't 1984) (insanity is inability to protect a person's own legal rights because of overall
inability to function in society); Wenthen v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 95 App. Div. 2d
852, 852, 464 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (2d Dep't 1983) (mem.) (afflictions rendering one incapable
of dealing with facts of incident in question are distinguished from overall inability to func-
tion in society). while the Court of Appeals has not directly commented on the concept of
temporary insanity, the Court has limited the impact of Hurd v. County of Allegany, 39
App. Div. 2d 499, 336 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1972), by disallowing tolling of the statute for post-
traumatic neuroses, see McCarthy, 55 N.Y.2d at 549 n.3, 435 N.E.2d at 1075 n.3, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 460 n.3, and for the temporary effects of medications, see Eisenbach, 62 N.Y.2d
at 975, 468 N.E.2d at 294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40. Thus, it remains possible that other
types of temporary insanity will be recognized. See, e.g., Barnes v. County of Onondaga, 103
App. Div. 2d 624, 626-30, 481 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542-44 (4th Dep't 1984) (accident victim re-
ceived toll for disability endured before victim recovered from mental afflictions).
17 See 62 N.Y.2d at 974-75, 468 N.E.2d at 294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40. On its face,
the Eisenbach decision excludes from the tolling provision only the temporary effects of
medication administered in the treatment of physical injuries. See id. Although this decision
will presumably not preclude courts from granting a toll for the permanent effects of medi-
cation, it is submitted that there are many temporary reactions from the more potent pain
relievers that also merit a toll. See infra note 25 (discussing effects of some analgesic
medications).
" See 62 N.Y.2d at 974-75, 468 N.E.2d at 294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40. Ordinarily,
the determination of a person's mental capacity is a question of fact. See McCarthy v. Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 435 N.E.2d 1072, 1074, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459
(1980); see also Chartener v. Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (insanity involves
contested factual issues). Rather than ruling that the temporary effects of medication are
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generally an issue of fact, the courts have denied the tolling period
as a matter of law when the plaintiff's mental affliction was unsub-
stantiated by evidence19 or was limited to a narrow area of the
plaintiff's affairs.20 However, the Eisenbach Court excluded the
temporary effect of painkilling drugs from the definition of in-
sanity without an analysis of the factual support for the plaintiff's
claim of incapacity.21 Instead, the Court based its unqualified hold-
ing on the source of the plaintiff's affliction-medications adminis-
tered to treat physical injuries. 22 Because of the Court's indiffer-
ence to the severity of the plaintiff's affliction, it is suggested that
the Court has removed a critical area of factual analysis from the
per se insufficient to constitute insanity, it is suggested that the Eisenbach court should
have distinguished the plaintiff's condition from insanity by examining his actual mental
capacity during the relevant period. See, e.g., Barnes v. County of Onondaga, 103 App. Div.
2d 624, 627-28, 481 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (4th Dep't 1984) (distinguishing plaintiff's mental
condition from post traumatic neurosis or temporary effects of medication).
19 See, e.g., Lacks v. Marcus, 68 App. Div. 2d 815, 815-16, 414 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (1st
Dep't 1979) (mem.). In Lacks, the Appellate Division dismissed an appeal from the lower
court's determination that the plaintiff was not insane because it was "unable to see any
evidence that plaintiff was 'insane' within the meaning of the statute." Id. The court viewed
the scope of the plaintiff's alleged disability as insufficient to constitute insanity and held
that her disability was not a disability to sue. Id. at 816, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 140; cf. Dumas v.
Agency for Child Dev., 569 F. Supp. 831, 833-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (plaintiff has burden of
proof to show entitlement to insanity toll).
10 See McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548-49, 435 N.E.2d 1072,
1074-75, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459-60 (1980). In McCarthy, the Court held that the plaintiff's
claim of insanity in the form of "post traumatic neurosis" was "untenable as a matter of
law." Id. The McCarthy Court reasoned that the tolling provision should apply only to af-
flictions resulting in an "over-all inability to function in society." Id. Thus, the Court denied
the plaintiff's claim of insanity because he was capable of dealing with his daily affairs, even
though he claimed to be incapable of dealing with the fact of his accident. Id. at 548, 435
N.E.2d at 1074, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 459. Unlike its approach in Eisenbach, see supra notes 11-
13 and accompanying text, in McCarthy, the Court did not dismiss the plaintiff's insanity
claim solely on the basis of the cause of his affliction, namely an automobile collision, see id.
at 545-49, 435 N.E.2d at 1073-75, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 458-60. Rather, the Court weighed the
merits of his claim. See id. The Court's refusal to recognize "post traumatic neurosis" as
insanity was merely a reflection of the Court's belief that a post traumatic neurosis does not
constitute a sufficient degree of disability to merit a toll. See id. The Court found "post
traumatic neurosis" to be simply a limited, rather than an overall, inability to conduct one's
affairs. See id.
21 See 62 N.Y.2d at 974-75, 468 N.E.2d at 294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40. Although the
Court considered the plaintiff's contention that he was "confused, disoriented, and unable
to effectively attend to [his] affairs," id. at 974, 468 N.E.2d at 294, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339, the
degree to which this affliction affected his mental abilities, and the extent to which it repre-
sented an overall disability, rather than a limited impairment of his capacity to manage his
affairs, played no apparent role in the Court's reasoning, see id. at 974-75, 468 N.E.2d at
294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
22 Id. at 975, 468 N.E.2d at 294-95, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 339-40.
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trier of fact.2 3 In light of the protective role of CPLR 208, it is
urged that the Court should merely issue guidelines to aid the trier
of fact rather than remove from its consideration an entire source
of mental disability.
It is further suggested that since the trend of the Court's re-
cent decisions has been to narrow the use of the insanity toll, the
Court may have provided resourceful defense counsel with an op-
portunity to argue for extensions of the Eisenbach holding to other
temporary mental afflictions, regardless of their severity.
While the Court's reasoning might appear to be consistent
with the legislative intention to construe "insanity" narrowly,
2 4 it
is submitted that this goal might have been achieved somewhat
less intrusively by limiting the holding of Eisenbach to its facts. It
is urged that by doing so the Court could have preserved the pro-
tection of CPLR 208 for those who are rendered truly incompetent
by the temporary effects of the more potent pain-relieving drugs.25
23 The Court's indifference to the degree of the plaintiff's affliction is reinforced by its
reasoning that some disability is suffered whenever pain relievers are used. See id. at 975,
468 N.E.2d at 295, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 340. It is suggested that the Court's acknowledgment of
the various degrees of disability caused by different painkillers, coupled with its use of the
word "whenever," see id., indicate that the Court meant to leave no room for exceptions to
its denial of the toll when painkillers used to treat injuries result in temporary disability, see
id. It is urged that the wisdom of this reasoning is questionable in light of the potential
unanticipated effects of analgesic drugs. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24 See FiFTH REP. at 43. The Committee that proposed tentative drafts of CPLR 208
concluded that "[lit was not possible to substitute the phrase 'mental illness', for the phrase
'insanity,' as had been suggested, since, in this context, the phrase 'mental illness' is too
broad and might result in an unwarranted extension of the time to commence action." Id.
While this language may appear to support the outcome of Eisenbach, independent of the
logic used to reach that outcome, it is suggested that the Court could have achieved a simi-
lar end by merely presenting conservative guidelines to be used by the trier of fact rather
than eliminating the factual analysis entirely. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
This approach, it is submitted, would harmonize the competing goals of a narrow construc-
tion of CPLR 208 and retention of the factual inquiry.
25 It is suggested that the Court could have rejected the plaintiff's contention on the
facts of the case, see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text, rather than issue an unquali-
fied exception to the definition of insanity. By entirely rejecting the possibility of temporary
insanity induced by painkilling drugs used to treat physical injuries, see supra notes 21-23
and accompanying text, the Court has ignored the possibility that truly severe temporary
mental afflictions can be caused by the more potent analgesics, particularly by narcotic ago-
nist analgesics frequently used to treat severe or chronic pain, see DRUG FACTS AND COMPAR-
ISONS 798-802 (J. Boyd ed. 1984); 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY
186-92 (P. Cantor ed. 1962). Among the more pronounced reactions occasionally noted from
the effect of such medications on the central nervous system are delirium, mental clouding,
transient hallucinations, mood changes, disorientation, confusion, and visual disturbances.
See DRUG FACTS AND COMPARISONS, supra, at 801. See generally DRUG TREATMENT. PmNCI-
PLES AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 319-25 (G. Avery ed.
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Nevertheless, Eisenbach is a strong reminder of the Court's rap-
idly developing determination to reverse the expansion of the toll-
ing provision accomplished through past litigation.
Thomas Infurna
CPLR 3025(c): Amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evi-
dence adduced at trial precluded when proposed amendment
would add new theory of liability based on previously unpleaded
facts resulting in prejudice
The CPLR mandates that pleadings be liberally construed1 to
1980) (discussing different uses of various analgesics in treatment of pain). It is suggested
that the penalization of individuals suffering, albeit temporarily, from these afflictions, con-
flicts with the legislative goal of protecting litigants who already "have difficulty enough."
See SECOND REP. at 58.
1 See CPLR 3026 (1974). CPLR 3026 provides:
Pleadings shall be liberally construed. Defects shall be ignored if a substantial
right of a party is not prejudiced.
Id. In addition to CPLR 3026, other provisions of the CPLR counsel against a rigid con-
struction of the pleadings. See, e.g., CPLR 3013 (1974) (requiring statements made in plead-
ing to be "sufficiently particular") (emphasis added); CPLR 3017(a) (Supp. 1984-1985) (al-
lowing court to grant "any type of relief . . . appropriate to the proof whether or not
demanded"); CPLR 3025(b) (1974) (requiring leave to amend pleading to be freely given).
One of the major accomplishments of the CPLR was the liberalization of pleadings.
SIEGEL § 207, at 244. The Civil Practice Act, which preceded the CPLR, prohibited the
pleading of evidence and required that pleadings state only material facts. See CPA § 241
(repealed 1963). These rigid pleading requirements of the CPA were abandoned by the
CPLR, which simply requires that the pleadings give the adverse party "notice" of the
"transactions [or] occurrences . . . intended to be proved" and indicate "the material ele-
ments of each cause of action or defense." See CPLR 3013 (1974). Generally, "if [any] cause
of action can be spelled out from the four corners of the pleading," then the pleading is
acceptable under the CPLR. See SIEGEL § 208, at 245.
In addition to the rejection of strict pleading requirements, the CPLR abandoned the
"theory of the pleadings" rule, which permitted a party to recover only on the theory
pleaded in his complaint. See id. § 209, at 247.
Soon after the enactment of the CPLR, the judiciary embraced the policy of liberality
contained in the CPLR in Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st
Dep't 1964). See SIEGEL § 208, at 246. In Foley, the First Department vacated an order
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a cause of action because the pleadings, "when
viewed with reason and liberality," were "'sufficiently particular"' to give the defendants
notice of the claims and their material elements. 21 App. Div. 2d at 68-69, 248 N.Y.S.2d at
129-30. The court noted:
